We revisit recent works by Don, Fehr, Majenz and Schaffner and by Liu and Zhandry on the security of the Fiat-Shamir transformation of Σ-protocols in the quantum random oracle model (QROM). Two natural questions that arise in this context are: (1) whether the results extend to the Fiat-Shamir transformation of multi-round interactive proofs, and (2) whether Don et al.'s O(q 2 ) loss in security is optimal.
Introduction
Reprogramming the quantum random oracle. We reconsider the recent work of Don, Fehr, Majenz and Schaffner [DFMS19] on the quantum random oracle model (QROM). On a technical level, they showed how to reprogram the QROM adaptively at one input. More precisely, for any oracle quantum algorithm A H , making q calls to a random oracle H and outputting a pair (x, z) so that some predicate V (x, H(x), z) is satisfied, they showed existence of a "simulator" S that mimics the random oracle, extracts x from A H by measuring one of the oracle queries to H, and then reprograms H(x) to a given value Θ so that z output by A H now satisfies V (x, Θ, z), except with a multiplicative O(q 2 ) loss in probability (plus a negligible additive loss). We emphasize that the challenging aspect of this problem is that A H 's queries to H may be in quantum superposition, and thus measuring such a query disturbs the state and thus the behavior of A H . Still, Don et al. managed to control this disturbance sufficiently. In independent work and using very different techniques, Liu and Zhandry [LZ19] showed a similar kind of result, but with a O(q 9 ) loss.
As an immediate application of this technique, it is then concluded that the Fiat-Shamir transformation of a Σ-protocol is as secure (in the QROM) as the original Σ-protocol (in the standard model), up to a O(q 2 ) loss, i.e., any of the typically considered security notions is preserved under the Fiat-Shamir transformation, even in the quantum setting. In combination with prior work on simulating signature queries [Unr17, KLS18] , security (in the QROM) of Fiat-Shamir signatures that arise from ordinary Σ-protocols then follows as a corollary.
Given important examples of multi-round public-coin interactive proofs, used in, e.g., MQDSS [CHR + 16] and for Bulletproofs [BBB + 18] 1 , a natural question that arises is whether these techniques and results extend to the reprogrammability of the QROM at multiple inputs and the security of the Fiat-Shamir transformation (in the QROM) of multi-round public-coin interactive proofs. Another question is whether the O(q 2 ) loss (for the original Σ-protocols) is optimal, or whether one might hope for a linear loss as in the classical case.
In this work, we provide answers to both these natural questions -and more.
A technical hurdle for generalizing [DFMS19] to multi-round Fiat-Shamir. To start with, we observe that the naive approach of applying the original result of [DFMS19] inductively so as to reprogram multiple inputs one by one does not work. This is due to a subtle technical issue that has to do with the precise statement of the original result. In more detail, the statement involves an additive error term ε x ≥ 0 that depends on the particular choice of the point x, which is (adaptively) chosen to be the input on which the random oracle (RO) is reprogrammed. The guarantee provided by [DFMS19] is that this error term stays negligible even when summed over all x's, i.e., x ε x = negl. The formulation of the result for individual x's with control over x ε x is important for the later applications to the Fiat-Shamir transformation. However, when applying the result twice in a row, with the goal being to reprogram the RO at two inputs x 1 , x 2 , then we end up with two error terms ε x1 and ε x1 x2 (with the second one depending on x 1 ), where the first one stays negligible when summed over x 1 and the second one stays negligible when summed over x 2 (for any x 1 ); but it is unclear that the sum ε x1,x2 := ε x1 + ε x1 x2 stays negligible when summed over x 1 and x 2 , which is what we would need to get the corresponding generalized statement.
Our results As a first contribution, we revise the original result from [DFMS19] of reprogramming the QROM at one input by showing an improved version that has no additive error term, but only the original multiplicative O(q 2 ) loss. For typical direct cryptographic applications, this improvement makes no big quantitative difference due to the error term being negligible, but: (1) it makes the statement cleaner and easier to formulate, (2) somewhat surprisingly, the proof is simpler than that of the original result in [DFMS19] , and (3) most importantly, it removes the technical hurdle to extend to multiple inputs. Indeed, we then get the desired multi-input reprogrammability result by means of a not too difficult, though somewhat tedious, induction argument.
Building on our multi-input reprogrammability result above, our next goal then is to show the security of the Fiat-Shamir transformation (in the QROM) of multi-round public-coin interactive proofs. In contrast to the original result in [DFMS19] for the Fiat-Shamir transformation of Σprotocols some additional work is needed here, to deal with the order of the messages extracted from the Fiat-Shamir adversary. Thus, as a stepping stone, we consider and analyze a variant of the above multi-input reprogrammability result, which enforces the right order of the extracted messages. As a simple corollary of this, we then obtain the desired security of multi-round Fiat-Shamir. Here, the multiplicative loss becomes O(q 2n ) for a (2n + 1)-round public-coin interactive proof with constant n.
In the context of digital signatures, the original motivation for the Fiat-Shamir transformation, we extend previous results by Unruh [Unr17] and Don et al. [DFMS19] to show that Fiat-Shamir signature schemes based on a multi-round, honest-verifier zero knowledge public-coin interactive quantum proof of knowledge have standard signature security (existential unforgeability under chosen message attacks, UF-CMA) in the QROM. Assuming the additional collision-resistancelike property of computationally unique responses, they are even strongly unforgeable. We go on to apply this result to the signature scheme MQDSS [CHR + 16], a candidate in the ongoing NIST standardization process for post-quantum cryptographic schemes [NIS], providing its first QROM proof.
Another application of our multi-round Fiat-Shamir result would for instance be to Bulletproofs [BBB + 18].
As a second application of our multi-input reprogrammability result, we show security (in the QROM) of the non-interactive OR-proof introduced by Liu, Wei and Wong [LWW04] , further analyzed by Fischlin, Harasser and Janson [FHJ] . While the well-known (interactive) OR-proof by Cramer, Damgård and Schoenmakers [CDS94] is a Σ-protocol and thus the results from [DFMS19] apply, the inherently non-interactive OR-proof by Liu et al. does not follow this blueprint of being obtained as the Fiat-Shamir transformation of a Σ-protocol (though in some sense it is "close" to being of this form). We show here how the 2-input version of our multi-input reprogrammability result implies security of this OR-proof in the QROM.
Our last contribution is a lower bound that shows that the multiplicative O(q 2 ) loss in the security argument of the Fiat-Shamir transformation of Σ-protocols is tight (up to a factor 4). Thus, the O(q 2 ) loss is unavoidable in general. Furthermore, we extend this lower bound to the Fiat-Shamir transformation of multi-round interactive proofs as considered in this work, and we show that also here to obtained loss O(q 2n ) is in general optimal, up to a constant that depends on n only.
Related work Before the recently obtained reduction [DFMS19, LZ19] was available, the Fiat-Shamir tranform in the QROM was studied in a number of works [Unr17, DFG13, KLS18] , where weaker security properties were shown. In addition, Unruh developed an alternative transform [Unr15] that provided QROM security at the expense of an increased proof size. The Unruh transform was later generalized to apply to 5-round public coin interactive proof systems [CHR + 18].
Notation
Up to some modifications, we follow closely the notation used in [DFMS19] . We consider a (purified) oracle quantum algorithm A that makesueries to an oracle, i.e., an unspecified function H : X → Y with finite non-empty sets X , Y. Formally, A is described by a sequence of unitaries A 1 , . . . , A q and an initial state |φ 0 . 2 For technical reasons that will become clear later, we actually allow (some of) the A i 's to be a projection followed by a unitary (or vice versa). One can think of such a projection as a measurement performed by the algorithm, with the algorithm aborting except in case of a particular measurement outcome.
For any concrete choice of H : X → Y, the algorithm A computes the state
where O H is the unitary defined by O H : |c |x |y → |c |x |y ⊕ c·H(x) for any triple c ∈ {0, 1},
x ∈ X and y ∈ Y, with O H acting on appropriate registers. We emphasize that we allow controlled queries to H. Per se, this gives the algorithm more power, and thus will make our result only stronger, but it is easy to see that such controlled queries to the standard quantum oracle for a function can always be simulated by means of ordinary queries, at the price of one additional query. 3 The final state A H |φ 0 is considered to be a state over registers X = X 1 . . . X n , Z and E. Following [DFMS19] , we introduce the following notation. For 0 ≤ i, j ≤ q we set
where, by convention, A H i→j is set to 1 if j ≤ i. Furthermore, we let
be the state of A after the i-th step but right before the (i + 1)-st query, which is consistent with |φ H q above. For a given function H : X → Y and for fixed x ∈ X and Θ ∈ Y, we define the reprogrammed function H * Θx : X → Y that coincides with H on X \ {x} but maps x to Θ. With this notation at hand, we can then write
for an execution of A where the oracle is reprogrammed at a given point x after the i-th query. We stress that (A H * Θx i→q )(A H 0→i ) can again be considered to be an oracle quantum algorithm B, which depends on Θ ∈ Y, that makesueries to (the unprogrammed) function H. Indeed, the (controlled) queries to the reprogrammed oracle H * Θx can be simulated by means of controlled queries to H (using one additional "work qubit"). 4 Exploiting that, in addition to unitaries, we allow projections as elementary operations, we can also understand (A H * Θx i→q )X(A H 0→i ) to be an oracle quantum algorithm again that makes oracle queries to H, where X is the projection X = |x x|, acting on the corresponding query register to the oracle.
More generally, for any x = (x 1 , . . . , x n ) ∈ X n without duplicate entries, i.e., x i = x j for i = j, and for any Θ ∈ Y n , we define
This will then allow us to consider (A H * Θ1 x1 * Θ2x2
as an oracle quantum algorithm with oracle queries to H, etc.
Eventually, we are interested in the probability that after the execution of the original algorithm A H , and upon measuring register X in the computational basis to obtain x = (x 1 , . . . , x n ) ∈ X n , the state of register Z is of a certain form dependent on x and H(x) = (H(x 1 ), . . . , H(x n )). Such a requirement (for a fixed x) is captured by a projection
where {Π x,Θ } x,Θ is a family of projections with x ∈ X n and Θ ∈ Y n , and with the understanding that |x x| acts on X and Π x,H(x) on register Z. We refer to such a family of projections as a quantum predicate. We use G Θ x as a short hand for G H * Θx
x , and we write G H x and G Θ x with x ∈ X and Θ ∈ Y for the case n = 1.
For an arbitrary but fixed x • ∈ X n , we are then interested in the probability
where the left hand side is our notation for this probability, where we understand A H to be an algorithm that outputs the measured x together with the quantum state z in register Z, and V to be the quantum predicate specified by the projections Π x,Θ . Correspondingly, Pr
2 for the n = 1 case.
An improved single-input reprogramming result
For the case n = 1, Don et al. [DFMS19] show the existence of a black-box simulator S such that for any oracle quantum algorithm A as considered above with oracle access to a uniformly random H, it holds that
for any x • ∈ X , where the ε x• 's are non-negative and their sum over x • ∈ X is bounded by 1/(2q|Y|), i.e., negligible whenever |Y| is superpolynomial. The notation (x, z) ← S A , Θ is to be understood in that in a first stage S A outputs x, and then on input Θ it outputs z. At the core, Equation (1) follows from Lemma 1 of [DFMS19] which shows that
and from which the construction of S can be extracted. The bound (1) on the "success probability" of S then follows from the observation that S can simulate the calls to H and to H * Θx by means of a 2(q+1)-wise independent hash function, and that H and H * Θx are indistinguishable for random H and Θ.
In this section we show an improved variant of Equation (1), which avoids the additive error term ε x• . While having negligible quantitative effect in typcial situations, it makes the statement simpler. In addition, as explained in the introduction, it circumvents a technical issue one encounters when trying to extend to the multi-input case. Furthermore, our improved version comes with a simpler proof. 5 The approach is to avoid the additive error term in Equation (2). We achieve this by slightly tweaking the simulator S. From the technical perspective, while on the left hand side of Equation (2) the expectation is over a random i ∈ {0, . . . , q}, selecting one of the q + 1 queries of A at random (where the X register of the output state is considered to be a final query), and a random b ∈ {0, 1}, our new version has syntactically the same left hand side, but with the expectation over a random pair (i, b) ∈ ({0, . . . , q 1} × {0, 1})∪{(q, 0)} instead. This allows us to absorb the additive error term into the success probability of the simulator. Furthermore, it holds for any fixed choice of Θ (and not only on average for a random choice).
Lemma 1 Let A be a q-query oracle quantum algorithm. Then, for any function H : X → Y, any x ∈ X and Θ ∈ Y, and any projection Π x,Θ , it holds that
where the expectation is over uniform
This new version of Equation (2) translates to a simulator S that works by running A, but with the following modifications. First, one of the q + 1 queries of A (also counting the final output in register X) is measured, and the measurement outcome x is output by (the first stage of) S. We emphasize that the crucial difference to [DFMS19] is that each of the q actual queries is picked with probability 2 2q+1 , while the final output is picked with probability 1 2q+1 . Then, very much as in [DFMS19] , this very query of A is answered either using the original H or using the reprogrammed oracle H * Θx, with the choice being made at random 6 , while all the remaining queries of A are answered using oracle H * Θx. Finally, (the second stage of) S outputs whatever A outputs.
In line with Theorem 1 in [DFMS19] , i.e. Equation (1) above, we obtain the following result from Lemma 1.
Theorem 2 (Measure-and-reprogram, single input) Let X and Y be finite non-empty sets. There exists a black-box two-stage quantum algorithm S with the following property. Let A be an arbitrary oracle quantum algorithm that makesueries to a uniformly random H : X → Y and that outputs some x ∈ X and a (possibly quantum) output z. Then, the two-stage algorithm S A outputs some x ∈ X in the first stage and, upon a random Θ ∈ Y as input to the second stage, a (possibly quantum) output z, so that for any x • ∈ X and any (possibly quantum) predicate V :
Furthermore, S runs in time polynomial in q, log |X | and log |Y|.
The proof of Lemma 1 follows closely the proof of Equation (1) in [DFMS19] , but the streamlined statement and simulator allow to cut some corners.
Proof (of Lemma 1). For any 0 ≤ i ≤ q, inserting a resolution of the identity and exploiting that
Rearranging terms, applying G Θ x = (|x x| ⊗ Π x,Θ ) and using the triangle equality, we can thus bound
Summing up the respective sides of the inequality over i = 0, . . . , q − 1, we get
By squaring both sides, dividing by 2q + 1 (i.e., the number of terms on the right hand side), and using Jensen's inequality on the right hand side, we obtain
and thus, noting that we can write
⊓ ⊔
For completeness, let us spell out how Theorem 8 of [DFMS19] on the generic security of the Fiat-Shamir transformation (in the QROM) can now be re-phrased, avoiding the negligible error term present in [DFMS19] . We refer to [DFMS19] or to our later Section 5 for the details on the Fiat-Shamir transformation.
Theorem 3 There exists a black-box quantum polynomial-time two-stage quantum algorithm S such that for any adaptive Fiat-Shamir adversary A, makingueries to a uniformly random function H with appropriate domain and range, and for any x • ∈ X :
Multi-input reprogrammability
In this section, we extend our (improved) results on adaptively reprogramming the quantum random oracle at one point x ∈ X to multiple points x 1 , . . . , x n ∈ X . This in turn will allow us to extend the results on the security of the Fiat-Shamir transformation to multi-round protocols. We point out again that the improvement of Lemma 1 over Lemma 1 in [DFMS19] plays a crucial role here, in that it circumvents the trouble with the negligible error term that occurs when trying to extend the result from [DFMS19] to the setting considered here. The starting point is the following generalized version of the problem considered in Section 3. We assume an oracle quantum algorithm A H that makesueries to a random oracle H : X → Y and then produces an output of the form (x 1 , . . . , x n , z), where z may be quantum, such that a certain (quantum) predicate V (x 1 , H(x 1 ), . . . , x n , H(x n ), z) is satisfied with some probability. The goal then is to turn such an A H into a multi-stage quantum algorithm S (the simulator) that, stage by stage, outputs the x i 's and takes corresponding Θ i 's as input, and eventually outputs a (possibly quantum) z with the property that V (x 1 , Θ 1 , . . . , x n , Θ n , z) is satisfied with similar probability.
The general case
Naively, one might hope for an S that outputs x 1 in the first stage (obtained by measuring one of the queries of A H ), and then on input Θ 1 proceeds by outputting x 2 in the second stage (obtained by measuring one of the subsequent queries of A H ), etc. However, since A H may query the hashes of x 1 , . . . , x n in an arbitrary order, we cannot hope for this to work. Therefore, we have to allow S to produce x 1 , . . . , x n in an arbitrary order as well. 7 Formally, we consider S with the following syntactic behavior: in the first stage it outputs a permutation π together with x π(1) and takes as input Θ π(1) , and then for every subsequent stage 1 < i ≤ n it outputs x π(i) and takes as input Θ π(i) ; eventually, in the final stage (labeled by n + 1) it outputs z. In line with earlier notation, but taking this additional complication into account, we denote such an execution of S as (π, π(x), z) ← S A , π(Θ) .
A final issue is that if x i = x j then H(x i ) = H(x j ) as well, whereas Θ i and Θ j may well be different. Thus, we can only expect S to work well when x 1 , . . . x n has no duplicates.
For us to be able to mathematically reason about the simulator described above, we introduce some additional notation. For the basic simulator from Lemma 1 we write, using r 1 = (b 1 , i 1 ), as
This can be recursively extended by applying it to A H now being S H,A Θ1,x1,r1 so as to obtain
.
In general, we can consider the following operator, which simulates A and performs n measurements:
where, for arbitrary but fixed n and Θ = (Θ 1 , . . . , Θ n ) ∈ Y n , the notation Θ is understood as Θ = (Θ 1 , . . . , Θ n−1 ) ∈ Y n−1 , and correspondingly for x etc. Finally, when considering fixed Θ ∈ Y n and x ∈ X n , we write S H r (A) := S H,A Θ,x,r . At the core of our multi-round result will be the following technical lemma, which generalizes Lemma 1.
Lemma 4 Let A be a q-query oracle quantum algorithm. Then, for any function H : X → Y, any x ∈ X n and Θ n ∈ Y n , and any projection Π x,Θ , it holds that
Proof. The proof is by induction on n, where the base case is given by Lemma 1.
For the induction step we first apply the base case, substituting x n for x 1 , Θ n for Θ 1 , r n for r 1 , H * Θx for H, andΠ xn,Θn for Π x1,Θ1 , wherê
dividing both sides by (2q + 1) 2(n 1) and swapping registers appropriately (to make sure that the register which contains x n comes after the others). Now fix r n . We defineΠ x,Θ := |x n x n | ⊗ Π x,Θ . and apply the induction hypothesis for n − 1, substituting S H * Θx
Since this inequality holds for any fixed r n , it also holds in expectation over r n . Substituting it in Equation 3, we retrieve the statement of the lemma. ⊓ ⊔
Remark 5 In case of x = (x 1 , . . . , x n ) ∈ X n without duplicate entries, it follows from the resulting mutual orthogonality of the projections X j and the definition of S H r (A) that the following holds. The term in the expectation E r in the inequality of Lemma 4 vanishes for any r = (i, b) for which there exist two distinct coordinates j = k with i j = i k . As such, we may well understand this expectation to be over r = (i, b) for which i j = i k whenever j = k; this only increases the expectation. 8 In other words, we may assume that random distinct queries are measured in order to extract x 1 , . . . , x n .
Theorem 6 (Measure-and-reprogram, multiple inputs) Let n be a positive integer, and let X , Y be finite non-empty sets. There exists a black-box polynomial-time (n + 1)-stage quantum algorithm S with the syntax as outlined at the start of this section, satisfying the following property. Let A be an arbitrary oracle quantum algorithm that makesueries to a uniformly random H : X → Y and that outputs a tuple x ∈ X n and a (possibly quantum) output z. Then, for any x • ∈ X n without duplicate entries and for any predicate V :
Proof. We consider the inequality of Lemma 4 with the expectation over r understood as in Remark 5. Additionally taking the expectation over H and Θ on both sides, we obtain
and note that this is equivalent to
since all values Θ j and H(x j ) have the same distribution. The term S H r (A)|φ 0 = S H,A Θ,x,r |φ 0 corresponds to the output of the simulator that uses oracle access to H to run A on an initial state |φ 0 , while measuring queries i j (finding x j as the outcome) and reprogramming the oracle at x j to Θ j from the (i j + b j )-th query onwards, with (i j , b j ) = r j .
Next, we note that the value of the right hand side does not change [Zha12] when instead of giving S oracle access to H, we let it choose a random instance from a family of 2q-wise 9 independent hash functions to simulate A on. The choice of r uniquely determines the permutation π with the property i π(1) < · · · < i π(n) ; by definition of S H,A Θ,x,r , the values x = (x 1 , . . . , x n ) are then extracted from the adversary's queries in the order π(x) = (x π(1) , . . . , x π(n) ). Since S chooses this r itself, we can assume that it includes π in its output. Likewise, the simulator takes as input to every stage -from the second to the (n+1)-st -a fresh random value, in the order given by π(Θ). However, by definition of Π x,Θ the final output of the simulator satisfies the predicate V with respect to the given order (without π), i.e. such that V (x, Θ, z) = 1, as is the claim of the theorem.
⊓ ⊔
The time-ordered case
In some applications, like the multi-round version of the Fiat-Shamir transformation, we need that the simulator extracts the messages in the right order. This can be achieved by replacing the hash list H(x) = H(x 1 ), . . . , H(x n ) , consisting of individual hashes, by a hash chain, where subsequent hashes depend on previous hashes. Intuitively, this enforces A to query the oracle in the given order. Formally, considering a function H :
Theorem 7 (Measure-and-reprogram, enforced extraction order) Let n be a positive integer, and let X 0 , X and Y be finite non-empty sets. There exists a black-box polynomial-time (n+1)-stage quantum algorithm S, satisfying the following property. Let A be an arbitrary oracle quantum algorithm that makesueries to a uniformly random H : (X 0 ∪ Y) × X → Y and that outputs a tuple x = (x 0 , x 1 , . . . , x n ) ∈ (X 0 × X n ) and a (possibly quantum) output z. Then, for any x • ∈ (X 0 × X n ) without duplicate entries and for any predicate V :
where ǫ x • is equal to n! |Y| when summed over all x • .
Remark 8 The additive error term n!/|Y| stems from the fact that the extraction in the right order fails if A succeeds in guessing one (or more) of the hashes in the hash chain. The claimed term can be improved to (n−1) 2 /|Y|+n!/|Y| 2 by doing a more fine-grained analysis, distinguishing between permutations π = id that bring 2 elements "out of order" or more. In any case, it can be made arbitrary small by extending the range Y of H for computing the hash chain.
Proof. First, we note that
Next, at the cost of n additional queries, we can extend A to an algorithm A + that actually outputs (v, z), since A + can easily obtain the H(v i )'s by making n queries to H. These observations together give
Let
Let Θ be uniformly random in Y n . An application of Theorem 6 yields a simulatorŜ with
Summing both sides of the inequality over h • i for i ≥ 2 yields
Recalling its construction, the simulatorŜ A+ begins by sampling a uniformly random permutation π, so we can write
By definition, the predicate V ′ (v, Θ, z) (with v of the form as explained above) is false whenever there exists an i ≥ 2 such that h i = Θ i−1 . Now suppose that π = id, then there must be some j such that π(j) < π(j − 1). This implies that the first π(j) stages ofŜ A+ which together (in the π(j)-th stage) produce v j = (h j , x j ) are independent of Θ j−1 , since Θ j−1 is given as input only at the later stage π(j − 1). We thus have the following, taking it as understood, here and in the sequel, that the random variables π, v, Θ and z are as in (5).
Using Equation (5), we can bound
We note that by definition of V ′ ,
Furthermore, we may define a new simulator S which takes oracle access to A and turns it into A + , and always chooses π = id instead of a random permutation. WhereŜ would output (v, z), S ignores the h-part of v and simply outputs (x, z). We then have
The multi-round Fiat-Shamir transformation A straightforward generalization of the Fiat-Shamir transformation can be applied to arbitrary (i.e., multi-round) public-coin interactive proof systems (PCIP). We show here security of this multi-round Fiat-Shamir transformation in the QROM.
Public coin interactive proofs and multi-round Fiat-Shamir
We begin by defining PCIPs, mainly to fix notation, and the corresponding multi-round Fiat-Shamir transformation.
Definition 9 (Public coin interactive proof system (PCIP)) A (2n + 1)-round public coin interactive proof system (PCIP) Π = (P, V) for a language L is a (2n+1)-round two-party interactive protocol of the form, with C being a finite non-empty set, and V a predicate:
.., a n , c n , z) = 1
Remark 10 If the language L is definied by means of an (efficiently verifiable) witness relation R ⊆ X × W, then the prover typcially gets a witness w for x as an additional input. We then also say that Π is a PCIP for the relation R. In case of a (2n+1)-round PCIP Π for a witness relation R that is hard on average, meaning that there exists an instance generator Gen with the property that for (w, x) ← Gen it holds that (w, x) ∈ R, but given x alone it is computationally hard to find w with (w, x) ∈ R, Π is also called an identification scheme.
Just as in the ordinary Fiat-Shamir transformation, the interaction used to enforce the time order between the prover committing to the message a i and receiving the challenge c i can be replaced by means of a hash function. In addition, we can include the previous challenge (i.e. the previous hash value) in the hash determining the next challenge to enforce the ordering of the n pairs (a i , c i ) according to increasing i. We thus obtain the following non-interactive proof system.
Definition 11 (Fiat-Shamir transformation for general PCIP (mFS))
Given an (2n+1)-round PCIP Π = (P, V) for a language L and a hash function H with appropriate domain, and range equal to C, we define the non-interactive proof system FS[Π] = (P H F S , V H F S ) as follows. The prover P outputs (x, a 1 , ..., a n , z) ← P H F S where z and a i for i = 1, ..., n are computed using P, and the challenges are computed as c 1 = H(0, x, a 1 ) and c i = H(i − 1, c i−1 , a i ) for i = 2, ..., n ,
The verifier outputs 'accept' iff V (x, a 1 , c 1 , ..., a n , c n , z) = 1 for c 1 = H(0, x, a 1 ) and c i = H(i − 1, c i−1 , a i ), i = 2, ..., n, denoted by V F S (x, a 1 , c 1 , ..., a n , c n , z) = 1.
Remark 12 The challenge number i (minus 1) is included in the hash input to ensure that the challenges are generated using distinct inputs to H with probability 1. This is to enable us to apply Theorem 7, which only holds for duplicate-free lists of hash inputs. In fact, any additional strings can be included in the argument when computing c i using H, without influencing the security properties of the non-interactive proof system in a detrimental way. In the literature one sometimes sees that the entire previous transcript is hashed (in which case the counter number i may then be omitted).
General security of multi-round Fiat-Shamir in the QROM
When constructing a reduction for mFS, this reduction is participating as a prover in the underlying PCIP, and is hence only provided with random challenges one at a time. We thus need the special simulator from Theorem 7, which always outputs the corresponding messages in the right order. The success of this simulator is based on the very essence of the Fiat-Shamir transformation, namely the fact that the intractability of the hash function takes the role of the interaction in enforcing a time order in the transcript of the PCIP.
The security of the multi-round Fiat-Shamir transformation follows as a simple Corollary of Theorem 7.
Corollary 13 There exists a black-box quantum polynomial-time (n+1)-stage quantum algorithm S such that for any adaptive adversary A against the multi-round Fiat-Shamir transformed version FS[Π] of a (2n + 1)-round PCIP Π, makingueries to a uniformly random function H with appropriate domain and range equal C, and for any x • ∈ X :
where the additive error term ǫ x • is equal to n! |C| when summed over all x • .
Proof. We may simply set x • = (x • , (0, a 1 ), . . . , (n−1, a n )) for arbitrary a 1 , . . . , a n , apply Theorem 7 and then sum over all choices of a 1 , . . . , a n to obtain the claimed inequality. Note that the round indices ensure that every such x • is duplicate free, satisfying the corresponding requirement of Theorem 7.
Note that the additive error terms reflect the fact that the random oracle only approximately succeeds in enforcing the original time order in the transcript of the PCIP. However, it can be made arbitrarily small, as discussed below.
Remark 14 There exist PCIPs with soundness error much smaller than 1/|C|. As an example, consider the sequential repetition of a Σ-protocol with special soundness. Here, the soundness error is 1/|C| n . In this case, the term proportional to 1/|C| renders the bound from the above theorem trivial. Note however, that (i) this situation is extremely artificial, as there is absolutely no reason to repeat sequentially instead of in parallel, and (ii) the additive error term can be made arbitrarily small by considering a variant Π ′ of Π where the random challenges are enlarged with a certain number of bits that are ignored otherwise, see Remark 8.
In fact, we suspect that the observation from (i) is true in a much broader sense: if a PCIP still has negligible soundness error when allowing the adversary to learn one of the challenges c i in advance of sending the corresponding commitment-type message a i , it seems like the number of rounds can be reduced and the loss in soundness error can be won back by parallel repetition.
As for the case of the Fiat-Shamir transformation for Σ-protocols, the general reduction implies that security properties that protect against dishonest provers carry over from the interactive to the non-interactive proof system. For a definition of the properties considered in the following theorem, see, e.g. [DFMS19] . The quantum proof-of-knowledge-property was intoduced in [Unr12] .
Corollary 15 (Preservation of Soundness/PoK) Let Π be a constant-round PCIP that has (statistical/computational) soundness, and/or the (statistical/computational) quantum proof-ofknowledge-property, respectively. Then, in the QROM, FS[Π] has (statistical/computational) soundness, and/or the (statistical/computational) quantum proof-of-knowledge-property, too.
Proof. Corollary 13 turns any dishonest prover A FS[Π] for FS[Π]
with success probability ǫ into a dishonest prover A Π for Π, with success probability ǫ · (2q + 1) −2n , where 2n + 1 is the number of rounds in Π. Since n is constant and q is polynomial in the security parameter, the success probabilities of the respective provers are polynomially related. The claimed implications follow now using the same arguments as in Corollaries 13 and 16 in [DFMS19] .
Tightness of the reductions
Here, we show tightness of our results. We start with proving tightness of Theorems 2 and 3 (up to essentially a factor 4). This implies that a O(q 2 )-loss is unavoidable in general. Indeed, the following result shows that for a large and natural class of Σ-protocols Σ, there exists an attack against FS[Σ] that succeeds with a probability q 2 times larger than the best attack against Σ. The attack is based on an application of Grover's quantum algorithm for unstructured search.
To our surprise, we could not find an analysis of Grover's algorithm in the regime we require in the literature. Grover search has been analyzed in the case of an unknown number of solutions [BBHT98] , but the focus of that work is on analyzing the expected number of queries required to find a solution, while we analyze the probability with which the Grover search algorithm succeeds for a fixed but arbitrary number of queries.
Theorem 16 Let L be a language, and let Σ be a Σ-protocol for L with challenge set C, special soundness and perfect honest-verifier zero-knowledge. Furthermore, we assume that the triples (a, c, z) produced by the simulator S ZK (x) are always accepted by the verifier even for instances x ∈ L, and that a has min-entropy γ. 10 Then for any q such that (q 2 + 1) · e 2 · (5q) 6 < |C| and 2 γ /(5q) 3 > 2, there exists a q-query dishonest prover that succeeds with probability q 2 /|C| in producing a valid FS[Σ]-proof for an instance x ∈ L.
The idea of the attack against FS[Σ] is quite simple. For a Σ-protocol that is special honest-verifier zero-knowledge, meaning that the simulation works by first sampling the challenge c and the repsonse z and then computing a fitting answer a as a function a(c, z), one simply does a Grover search to find a pair (c, z) for which H x, a(c, z) = c. For a typical H, this will give a quadratic improvement over the classical search, which, for a random H, succeeds with probability q/|C| (due to the special soundness). A subtle issue is that, for some (unlikely) choices of H, there are actually many (c, z) for which H x, a(c, z) = c, in which case the Grover search "overshoots". In the formal proof below, this is dealt with by controlling the probability of H having this (unlikely) property. Also, it removes the special honest-verifier zero-knowledge property by doing the Grover search over the randomness of the simulator, which requires some additional caution.
Remark 17 It is not hard to see that Theorem 16 still holds in the following two variations of the statement. (1) H(x, a) is random and independent for different choices of a, but is not necessarily independent for different choices of x.
(2) The Σ-protocol Σ is replaced by Σ ′ , which has its challenge enlarged with a certain number of bits that are ignored otherwise, in line with Remark 14, and FS[Σ ′ ] then uses an H with a correspondingly enlarged range. Let p H 1 be the fraction of random coins from R that map to 1 under f H . Note that by the special soundness of Σ, in any accepting triple a determines c and we thus have E H [p H 1 ] = 1 |C| . By the way Grover works, after q iterations (requiringueries to H) the probability p H 2 of finding such an input is sin 2 ((2q + 1)Θ H ), where 0 ≤ Θ H ≤ π/2 is such that sin 2 (Θ H ) = p H 1 . Now as long as Θ is not too large to begin with (i.e. as long as the Grover search will not 'overshoot'), p H 2 is approximately a factor q 2 larger than p H 1 . Our goal will be to show that also on average over H, the improvement is at least q 2 . To this end we define H bad := {H : p H 1 > sin 2 ( π 6q+3 )} and H good its complement. Then, We use the following Chernoff bound:
Setting δ := |C| (5q) 3 , together with the inequalities derived above this leads to
where we used 2 γ (5q) 3 > 2 in the second to last, and |C| > (q 2 + 1) · e 2 · (5q) 6 in the last inequality. Plugging this bound into Equation 6, we get
Thus, the success probability of our adversary A F S after makingueries to H is at least q 2 |C| . ⊓ ⊔
The tightness of Corollary 13 follows from the above tightness result for the case of Σ-protocols in a fairly straightforward manner.
Theorem 18 For every positive integer n, there exists a (2n+1)-round PCIP Π with soundness error ǫ and challenge space C such that |C| ≥ 1/ǫ and such that there exists a q-query dishonest prover A on FS(Π) with success probability n −2n q 2n ǫ.
Before proving the theorem, we show how it implies the tightness of Theorem 13.
Corollary 19
The security loss in the bound in Corollary 13 is optimal, up to a multiplicative factor that depends on n only.
Proof. Let Π be a PCIP as shown to exist in Theorem 18. Let ǫ Π , and ǫ FS(Π) (q), be the soundness error of Π, and the one of its Fiat Shamir transformation against q-query adversaries, respectively. By Theorem 18, ǫ FS(Π) (q) ≥ n −2n q 2n ǫ Π .
Theorem 13, on the other hand, yields
where we used the condition on the challenge space size from Theorem 18 in the last line. Rearranging terms we obtain
where we have used 1 ≤ q in the last line. In summary, we have constants c 1 = n −2n and c 2 = 2(n + 3) 2n such that
⊓ ⊔ Proof (of Theorem 18). LetΣ be a Σ-protocol for a language L fulfilling the requirements of Theorem 16. Let the challenge space be denoted byĈ. Given an arbitrary positive integer, we define an (2n+1)-round PCIP Π for the same language L by means of n sequential independent executions ofΣ . Concretely, the 2n + 1 messages of Π are given in terms of the messagesâ i ,ĉ i and z i of the i-th repetition ofΣ as a 1 =â 1 c i = (ĉ i , r i ) for i = 1, ..., n a i = (â i ,ẑ i−1 ) for i = 2, ..., n, and
where r i is an independent random string of arbitrary (but fixed) length, which is ignored otherwise (in line with Remark 14). The purpose of r i is to make the challenge space C of Π arbitrary large, as required. The verification procedure of Π simply checks if all the triples (â i ,ĉ i ,ẑ i ) are accepted byΣ. By the special soundness property ofΣ, the soundness error of this PCIP is ǫ = |Ĉ| −n . Using Theorem 16, we can attack the Fiat-Shamir transformation ofΣ repeatedly to devise an attack agains FS(Π): first use Theorem 16 to findâ 1 andẑ 1 , then use it again to findâ 2 andẑ 2 , etc., having the property that with the correctly computed challenges these form valid triples for an instance x ∈ L. In each invocation of Theorem 16 we use a q ′ -query attack, which then succeeds with probability q ′2 /|Ĉ|. Thus, using in total q = nq ′ queries, we succeed in breaking FS[Π] with probability q ′2n /|Ĉ| n = n −2n q 2n ǫ, as claimed.
There are two issues we neglected in the above argument. First, we actually employ Theorem 16 for attacking a variant ofΣ that has its challenge enlarged (and thus is not special sound); and, second, the challenge c i is computed as
which is not a uniformly random function of x andâ i (but only ofâ i ). However, by Remark 17, the attack from Theorem 16 still applies. ⊓ ⊔ 7 Applications 7.1 Digital signature schemes from multi-round Fiat-Shamir
One of the prime applications of the Fiat-Shamir transformation is the construction of digital signature schemes from interactive identification schemes. In this context, multi-round variants have also been used. An example where a QROM reduction is especially desirable is MQDSS [CHR + 16], a candidate digital signature scheme in the ongoing NIST standardization process for post-quantum cryptographic schemes [NIS]. This digital signature scheme is constructed by applying the multiround Fiat-Shamir transformation to the 5-round identification scheme by Sakumoto, Shirai, and Hiwatari [SSH11] based on the hardness of solving systems of multivariate quadratic equations.
In this section, we present a generic construction of a digital signature scheme based on multiround FS, and give a proof sketch of its strong unforgeability under chosen message attacks. We refrain from giving a full, self-contained proof here so as to not distract from our main technical result and its implications. Many, though not all, parts of the argument are very similar to the ones made elsewhere for the 3-round case.
The following construction is a straightforward generalization of the original construction of Fiat and Shamir.
Definition 20 (Fiat-Shamir signatures from a general PCIP) Given an (2n+1)-round public coin identification scheme Π = (Gen, P, V) for a witness relation R and a hash function H with appropriate domain and range equal to C, we define the digital signature scheme Sig[Π] = (Gen, Sign, Verify) as follows. The key generation algorithm Gen is just the one from Π. The signing algorithm Sign, on input a secret key sk and a message m, outputs σ = (a 1 , ..., a n , z) ← Sign sk (m) where z and a i for i = 1, ..., n are computed using P(pk), and the challenges are computed as c 1 = H(0, pk, m, a 1 ) and c i = H(i − 1, c i−1 , a i ) for i = 2, ..., n .
The verification algorithm Verify, on input a public key pk, a message m and a signature σ = (a 1 , ..., a n , z), computes c i as specified above, outputs 'accept' iff V pk (a 1 , c 1 , ..., a n , c n , z) = 1, denoted by Verify pk (m, σ) = 1.
We note that the above definition is equivalent to the following, alternative formulation: Let As an identification scheme is an interactive honest-verifier zero knowledge proof of knowledge of a secret key, the above signature scheme is a a non-interactive zero knowledge proof of knowledge of a secret key according to Corollary 13. For a digital signature scheme, however, the stronger security notion of (strong) unforgeability against chosen message ((s)UF-CMA) attacks is required.
In the following, we give a proof sketch for the fact that the above signature scheme is (s)UF-CMA. This fact follows immediately once we have convinced ourselves that a certain result by Unruh about the Fiat-Shamir transformation holds for the multi-round case as well: For the Fiat-Shamir transformation of Σ-protocols, extractability implies a stronger notion of extractability enabling a proof of (s)UF-CMA [Unr17] . Here, we just patch the parts of the proof from [Unr17] that make use of the fact that the underlying PCIP has only three rounds.
For the following we need the notion of a PCIP having computationally unique responses.
Definition 22 (Computationally unique responses -PCIP) A (2n + 1)-round PCIP Π = (P, V) is said to have computationally unique responses if given a partial transcript (x, a 1 , c 1 , . . . a i , c i ) it is computationally hard to find two accepting conversations that both extend the partial transcript but differ in (at least) a i+1 (here we consider z to be equal to a n+1 ), i.e. for con i = x, a 1 , c 1 , . . . a i , c i , a
n , z (j) , j = 1, 2 we have that Pr [V(con 1 ) = 1 ∧ V(con 2 ) = 1 : (con 1 , con 2 ) ← A]
is negligible for computationally bounded (quantum) A, where a
i+1 . Equipped with this definition, we can state the main result of this section.
Theorem 23 ((s)UF-CMA of multi-round FS signatures) Let Π be a PCIP for some hard relation R, which is a quantum proof of knowledge and satisfies completeness, HVZK, and has unpredictable commitments 12 as well as a superpolynomially large challenge space. Then Sig[Π] is existentially unforgeable under chosen message attack (UF-CMA). If Π in addition has computationally unique responses, Sig[Π] is strongly existentially unforgeable under chosen message attack (sUF-CMA).
In [Unr17] (Theorem 24, and 25, respectively), it is proven that an extractable FS proof system (of an HVZK Σ-protocol, and of an HVZK Σ-protocol with computationally unique responses, respectively) satisfies the stronger notion of (strong) simulation-sound extractability. In addition, it is shown that such a FS proof system gives rise to a (s)UF-CMA signature scheme if the underlying relation is hard. Corollary 15 implies that FS[Π * ] is indeed extractable if Π is extractable. Below we rely on the proof in [Unr17] to argue simulation-sound extractability, only pointing out a particular difference for the multi-round case.
Proof (sketch). Since Π is a quantum proof of knowledge, so is Π * . By Corollary 15, FS[Π * ] is a quantum proof of knowledge (extractable), and by Theorem 20 in [Unr17] (which easily generalizes to the multi-round setting), completeness, unpredictable commitments 13 and HVZK of Π * together imply ZK for FS[Π * ]. For the proof that FS[Π * ] is also simulation-sound extractable, we refer to the proof of Theorem 24 in [Unr17] , noting only that in the hop from Game 1 to Game 2 we have to adjust the argument as follows: Let S ZK be the zero-knowledge simulator that runs the HVZK simulator from Π * and reprograms the oracle as necessary. We write H f for the oracle H after it has been reprogrammed by S ZK , at the end of the run of A. We have to show that V H f F S (x, a 1 , . . . , a n , z) = 1 implies V H F S (x, a 1 , . . . , a n , z) = 1, where (x, a 1 , . . . , a n , z) is the final output of A. Suppose the implication does not hold. Then either (i) H f (0, x, a 1 ) = H(0, x, a 1 )
In case (i) holds, A has queried x and the corresponding forged proof that was output by S ZK starts with a 1 . In case (ii), assume that
Then, H f (i − 1, ..., H(1, H(0, x, a 1 ), a 2 ), ..., a i ) = H(i − 1, ..., H(1, H(0, x, a 1 ), a 2 ), ..., a i ) which means that A either queried x and the corresponding forged proof that was output by S ZK starts with a 1 , or else A has queried some x ′ such that H(1, H(0, x, a 1 ) , a 2 ), . . . , a i−1 ) and a i = a ′ i , where (a ′ 1 , . . . , a ′ i ) is part of the S ZK proof resulting from the query x ′ . By the fact that H is a random oracle, it is infeasible for A to find such an x ′ .
In the context of weak simulation-sound extractability, the fact that A has queried x is enough to derive a contradiction. For the strong variant, we now have that S ZK has output (x, a 1 , a ′ 2 , . . . , a ′ n , z ′ ) such that V(x, a 1 , H f (0, x, a 1 ), a ′ 2 , c ′ 2 . . . , a ′ n , c ′ n , z ′ ) = 1 and A has output (x, a 1 , a 2 , . . . , a n , z) such that V(x, a 1 , H f (0, x, a 1 ), a 2 , c 2 , . . . , a n , c n , z) = 1 (and A knows both since it interacted with S ZK ). By the computationally unique responses property of Π, it must be that a 2 = a ′ 2 . But then it follows that
(remember that both proofs are accepting with respect to H f ) which in turn implies that a 3 = a ′ 3 , etc. Thus, we obtain that A has output a proof that was produced by S ZK , yielding a contradiction. We conclude that V H f F S (x, a 1 , . . . , a n , z) = 1 implies V H F S (x, a 1 , . . . , a n , z) = 1 except with negligible probability.
In the rest of the proof of Theorems 24 and 25 in [Unr17] , no properties specific to a threeround scheme are used, and so the results extend to the PCIP context, that is, FS[Π * ] is (strongly) simulation-sound extractable. Now applying Theorem 31 from [Unr17] , we obtain that Sig[Π] is (s)UF-CMA.
Together with the fact that commit-and-open PCIPs can easily be made quantum extractable in the right sense by using standard hash-based commitments based on a collapsing hash function, we obtain the security of the MQDSS signature scheme. Recall that the standard hash-based commitment scheme works as follows. On input s, the commitment algorithm samples a random opening string u and outputs it together with the commitment c = H(s, u). Opening just works by recomputing the hash and comparing it with c . Note that, while this commitment scheme is collapse-binding [Unr16] , we need the stronger property of collapsingness of the function defined by the commitment algorithm that, on input a string and some randomness, outputs a commitment (collapse-binding only requires the collapsingness with respect to the committed string, not the opening information).
Corollary 24 (sUF-CMA of MQDSS) Let Π SSH be the 5-round identification scheme from [SSH11] repeated in parallel a suitable number of times and instantiated with the standard hashbased commitment scheme using a collapsing hash function. Then the Fiat-Shamir signature scheme constructed from Π SSH is sUF-CMA.
Proof (sketch). In Π SSH , the honest prover's first message consists of two commitments, and the second and final messages contain functions of the strings committed to in the first message. This structure, together with the computational binding property (implied by the collapse binding property) of the commitments, immediately implies that Π SSH has computationally unique responses. According to Corollary 30 in the appendix, Π SSH is a quantum proof of knowledge. It also has HVZK according to [SSH11] . Finally, the first message of Π SSH is clearly unpredictable. An application of Theorem 23 finishes the proof. ⊓ ⊔
Sequential Or Proofs
A second application of our multi-input version of the measure-and-reprogram result is to the ORproof as introduced by Liu, Wei and Wong [LWW04] and further analyzed by Fischlin, Harasser and Janson [FHJ]. This is an alternative (non-interactive) proof for proving existence/knowledge of (at least) one of two witnesses without revealing which one, compared to the well known technique by Cramer, Damgård and Schoenmakers [CDS94] . Formally, given two Σ-protocols Σ 0 , and Σ 1 , for languages L 0 , and L 1 , respectively, [LWW04] proposes as a non-interactive proof for the OR-language L ∨ = {(x 0 , x 1 ) : x 0 ∈ L 0 ∨ x 1 ∈ L 1 } a quadruple π ∨ = (a 0 , a 1 , z 0 , z 1 ) such that V H ∨ (x 0 , x 1 , π ∨ ) := V 0 x 0 , a 0 , H(1, x 0 , x 1 , a 1 ), z 0 ∧ V 1 x 1 , a 1 , H(0, x 0 , x 1 , a 0 ), z 1 is satisfied. Fischlin et al. call this construction sequential OR proof. We emphasize that the two challenges c 0 and c 1 are computed "over cross", i.e., the challence c 0 for the execution of Σ 0 is computed by hashing a 1 , and vice versa. It is straightforward to verify that if Σ 0 and Σ 1 are special honest-verifier zero-knowledge, meaning that for any challenge c and response z one can efficiently compute a first message a such that (a, c, z) is accepted, then it is sufficient to be able to succeed in one of the two interactive protocols Σ 0 and Σ 1 in order to honestly produce such an OR-proof π ∨ . Thus, depending on the context, it is sufficient that one instance is in the corresponding language, or that the prover knows one of the two witnesses, to produce π ∨ . Indeed, if, say, x 0 ∈ L 0 (and a witness w 0 is available), then π ∨ can be produced as follows. Prepare a 0 according to Σ 0 , compute c 1 := H(0, x 0 , x 1 , a 0 ) and simulate z 1 and a 1 using the special honestverifier zero-knowledge property of Σ 1 so that V 1 (x 1 , a 1 , c 1 , z 1 ) is satisfied, and then compute the response z 0 for the challenge c 0 := H(1, x 0 , x 1 , a 1 ) according to Σ 0 . On the other hand, intuitively one expects that one of the two instances must be true in order to be able to successfully produce a proof. Indeed, [LWW04] shows security of the sequential OR in the (classical) ROM.
[FHJ] go a step further and show security in the (classical) non-programmable ROM. Here we show that our multi-input version of the measure-and-reprogram result (as a matter of fact the 2-input version) implies security in the QROM.
Theorem 25 There exists a black-box quantum polynomial-time interactive algorithmP, which first outputs a bit b and two instances x 0 , x 1 , and in a second stage acts as an interactive prover that runs Σ b on instance x b , such that for any adversary A makingueries to a uniformly random function H and for any x • 0 , x • 1 :
: (x 0 , x 1 , π ∨ ) ← A H .
As explained above, the execution (b, x 0 , x 1 , v b ) ← P A , V b should be understood in thatP A first outputs x 0 , x 1 and b, and then it engages with V b to execute Σ b on instance x b . Thus, the statement ensures that if A H succeeds to produce a convincing proof π ∨ thenP A succeeds to convincingly run Σ 0 or Σ 1 (with similar success probability), where it is up toP A to choose which one it wants to do. Of course, the statement translates to the static setting where the two instances x 0 and x 1 are fixed and not produced by the dishonest prover.
Proof. The algorithm A fits well into the statement of Theorem 6 with the two extractable inputs x 0 = (0, x 0 , x 1 , a 0 ) andx 1 = (1, x 0 , x 1 , a 1 ). Thus, we can consider the 3-stage algorithm S ensured by Theorem 6, which behaves as follows with at least the probability given by the right hand side of the claimed inequality. In the first stage, it outputs a permutation on the set {0, 1}, which we represent by a bit b ∈ {0, 1} with b = 0 corresponding to the identity permutation, as well asx b = (b, x 0 , x 1 , a b ). On input a random Θ b = c 1−b ("locally" chosen byP), S then outputs x 1−b = (1 − b, x 0 , x 1 , a 1−b ). Finally, on input a random Θ 1−b = c b (provided by V b as the challenge upon the first message a b ), S outputs z 0 , z 1 so that V ∨ is satisfied with the challenges c b and c 1−b , and thus in particular V b x b , a b , c b , z b is satisfied. This directly shows the existence ofP as claimed.
⊓ ⊔ that there exists a quantum extractor. This makes the scheme a quantum proof of knowledge. The argument follows the same lines as the one given in [DFMS19] to prove that t-soundness and quantum-computationally unique responses imply the quantum proof-of-knowledge-property, which in turn is an extension of the result by Unruh for Σ-protocols with perfect unique responses [Unr12] .
Recall the definition of a collapsing relation, [DFMS19, Definition 23], a generalization of the notion of a collapsing hash function [Unr16] . We define the notion of collapsingness for interactive proof systems as follows:
Definition 27 A (2n + 1)-round interactive proof system Π is called collapsing, if the relation R Π : X × Y → {0, 1} with X = C n × A 1 and Y = A 2 × ... × A n × Z given by the verification predicate V Π of Π is collapsing from X to Y.
Note that for n = 1, this notion of collapsingness coincides with the notion of quantum-computationally unique responses from [DFMS19] .
Given a q2-identification scheme Π, consider the following straightforward (first stage of a) quantum extractor E A Π . The extractor runs the prover A using honestly sampled challenges to obtain a first transcript t (1) . Now it rewinds three times and reruns A, each time with a fresh pair of challenges, chosen such as to obtain t (i) , i = 2, 3, 4 such that the four transcripts fulfill the conditions (13). For this extractor, we obtain the following Theorem 28 Let Π a q2-extractable q2-identification scheme that is also collapsing. Then the success probability of the extractor E A Π is lower-bounded in terms of the success probability of the prover A as
Pr
The proof of this theorem is essentially the same as for Theorem 25 in [DFMS19] , which is a slight modification of an argument from [Unr12] .
As a corollary, we obtain the fact that for q2 identification schemes, q2-extractability and collapsingness imply the quantum proof of knowledge property as defined in [Unr12] .
Corollary 29 Let Π a q2-extractable q2-identification scheme that is also collapsing. Then it is a quantum proof of knowledge.
In particular, the 5-round identification scheme Π SSH from [SSH11] which is used to construct the post-quantum digital signature scheme MQDSS has these properties under plausible assumptions, namely that it is instantiated with the standard hash-based commitment scheme using a collapsing hash function [Unr16] (see discussion towards the end of Section 7.1). For MQDSS, this is no additional assumption, as the Fiat-Shamir transformation uses the QROM anyway, and a quantum accessible random oracle is collapsing by [Unr16] .
Corollary 30 If the 5-round identification scheme from [SSH11] is instantiated with the standard hash-based commitment scheme using a collapsing hash function, it is a quantum proof of knowledge.
Proof (sketch). According to [CHR + 16], Π SSH is a q2-extractable q2 identification scheme. In Π SSH , the honest prover's first message consists of two commitments, and the second and final messages contain functions of the strings commited to in the first message, and some opening information, respectively. Measuring a function of a register is equivalent to a partial computational basis measurement of that register. According to the the collapsing property of the hash function, no efficient algorithm can distinguish whether the the committed string and the opening information are measured or not. This clearly implies the same indistinguishability for partial measurements of the string register, which implies that Π SSH is collapsing. ⊓ ⊔ Note that the above proof works for any multi-round PCIP that has a similar commit-and-open structure.
